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I am grateful for this memorable opportunity and privilege
of joining with Dr. Cohen and Dr. Hartman in a consideration of
selected legal materials which will demonstrate the profound sig-
nificance of ethical values as they have affected the judicial process
in the Anglo-American jural order in general, and in the Supreme
Court of Ohio in particular. I shall approach these materials as
a member of the scholastic school of natural law and ultimately
appraise in terms of agreement and disagreement with that school
the choice of conflicting values which constituted the starting
points for the majority and minority opinions in the cases under
examination.
In a particular decision, a judge may adopt a set of ethical
values, determined by a priori convictions, concerning the nature
of man, law, and society, national or international. If his decisions
consistently postulate these values, he may be classified at least
approximately as professing a specific juristic faith. But a varia-
tion of subjective response to these values may shift a particular
jurist from one position to another in a specific fact situation.
While the normative elements inherent in every judicial process
may be precisely and definitely segregated into distinct patterns
for purposes of comparison and contrast, no exact classification of
jurists into schools of jurisprudence is possible. I shall analyze
the cases, therefore, not in terms of judicial personnel and their
psychology, but insofar as the legal materials exhibit a clash of
concepts, ideals, and methods which are typical of diverse bodies
of juristic thought.
Basic problems in both national and international law and
society have been presented by the cases under discussion. In the
national sphere, two dominant issues emerge in four cases demon-
strating the changing emphasis of constitutional restraints with
respect to property rights and civil liberties. In the first two
cases, a right of personality of an individual, namely, the right of
freedom from governmental coercion with respect to religious be-
lief, was weighed against a right of the moral person of the State,
nainely, the right of survival. In the third and fourth cases, a
right of personality of an individual, i.e. the right of health and
safety, was balanced against a right of substance of another in-
dividual. In the fifth and sixth cases, the right of substance of an
individual was weighed against a conflicting right of substance of
another individual. Finally, in the seventh case, the rights of
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substance of two nations were balanced against the background
of international law.
In 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,' hold-
ing unconstitutional a state statute which required children to
salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag in order to be
eligible to continue in attendance at free, public schools, and thus
avoid the penalty imposed for non-attendance at school. It thus
expressly overruled the case of Minersvifle School District v.
Gobitis,2 which it had adjudicated in 1940. In the words of the
Justice who wrote the majority opinion in the Gobitis case and
the minority opinion in the Barnette case: "That which three
years ago had seemed to five successive courts to be within per-
missible areas of legislation is now outlawed by the deciding shift
of opinion of two Justices".
This amazing and historic shift of opinion may be interpreted
as a victory for a type of jurisprudence which places a maximum
value upon the integration of law and morals, upon the traditional
American concept of judicial supremacy, as distinguished from
legislative supremacy, and upon a body of principles of right and
wrong to which even the popular will is subordinate. The decision
in the Barnette case was a defeat for what has been called Ana-
lytical Jurisprudence, which maximizes the value of legislation,
mni mizes that of discovered law, and restrains the judge from
appealing to constitutional, and hence ethical, standards of right
and wrong, or good and evil, to invalidate an act of the Legislature,
regarded as morally, as well as legally, infallible and omnipotent.
More value was accorded to a personality right of the individual
in the Barnette case than in the Gobitis case.
In 1937, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a five
to four decision, decided the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish,3 holding constitutional a state statute, providing for the es-
tablishment of minimum wages for women. It thus expressly over-
ruled the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital,4 which it had de-
cided in 1923. What controlling ethical factors resulted in this
basic change in American constitutional law? Here as in the pre-
ceding case, the shift was in the direction of placing a higher value
upon a right, or moral interest, of personality, for while the im-
mediate interest protected in the Parrish case was an interest of
substance, namely a minimum wage, nevertheless the most vital
interest was the social interest in the right of women to live in
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
3 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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safety with reference to their health and morals. But this time
it was the state which was according greater preciousness to a
right of personality by restricting the employer's right of property.
Analytical Jurisprudence would support the constitutionality
of the statute in the Parrish case, not because of its concern for
the sacredness of human personality, but because of its emphasis
upon the necessity of making the judicial process subordinate to
the legislative. For the same reason, it would have held constitu-
tional, for example, a statute repealing the living wage law in ques-
tion. For Analytical Jurisprudence, the presumption of the con-
stitutionality of legislation exists whether the statute in question
devalues rights of personality or substance, or over-values them.
for the Sovereign, when a law maker, with a direct mandate from
the people, can do but little wrong. It may be noted that some con-
stitutional experts accept the power-concept of law implicit in
Analytical Jurisprudence when a statute curtails a property right,
but rejects this concept when the legislation in question delimits
a right of personality.
Actually the majority opinion in the Parrish case did not rely
on Analytical Jurisprudence, but appealed to normative criteria
to uphold the statute as constitutional. This opinion postulated a
sociological conception of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and found that according
to this conception it was constitutional for a state in the exercise
of its police power to restrict freedom of contract if this was neces-
sary to promote the social interest in the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people. This opinion de-emphasized the individual's
rights of substance and substituted a sociological morality of
property for the idea that each individual has a constitutionally
protected right to determine his economic status even to his own
and society's, detriment.
The minority of the court in the Parrish case, and the major-
ity in the Adkins case, likewise had recourse to ethical values, but
for the purpose of setting up a constitutional curb on the legisla-
ture. The right of an individual to his property was detached from
social implications. The test of liberty of contract was not to be
related to the question whether there was economic freedom.
Under the system of morals premised by the minority of the Court
in the Parrish case, the common good itself was better served by
the legal order's protection of interests of property, rather than the
safeguarding of interests of personality.
In our fifth case, Oleff v. Hodapps as well as in the sixth,
Everet v. Williams (1725)6 a right of substance of one person was
5 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
6 9 L.Q. Rev. 197 (1893).
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weighed against a conflicting right of substance of another in-
dividual. They illustrate the relevance of moral considerations in
the judicial process. They exemplify how jurists reply differently
to such questions as: should law be an instrument for the expres-
sion of the will of supreme civil authority, as such, or should it be
the tool of a system of morals, and if the latter, what particular
system?
The Oleff case was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
1935. The facts were that A and B duly made a written contract,
in conformity with a state statute, whereby they entered into a joint
and survivorship building and loan association account. A murder-
ed B. The question was whether A, as the survivor, was entitled
to the money which had been deposited under this contract. By a
divided court, it was held that A was entitled to the money. The
reason was that A had a vested property right, which was not di-
vested by the criminal act of A, in the absence of a statute. The
vested right resulting from the contract was said to be absolute
and complete. Property rights were referred to as sacred.
The majority opinion in the Oleff case illustrates the extremes
to which Analytical Jurisprudence may be carried. This type of
Jurisprudence is characterized by an amoral approach to the judi-
cal process and by a very great reliance upon legalistic concepts
for their own sake, apart from the reason or morals which origi-
nally lead to their creation and acceptance by the legal order. It
denies to a judge the right to make law.
The minority opinion in the Oleff case held that "public policy
was against assuring to a criminal the fruits of his crime". It is
interesting to note that the dissenting opinion which imported right
ethical values into the adjudication, did so by means of narrow,
logical distinctions between formalized analytical concepts. The
dissenting opinion reasoned that the property did not legally be-
long to A, the murderer, because A had no vested right, but only
a chose in action in consequence of his contract with B, which did
not create a vested joint tenancy, but only a non-vested right of
joint survivorship, since personalty, and not realty, was involved.
The court would not be disturbing vested property rights, there-
fore, if it withheld its aid to A, attempting to enforce his alleged
right which rested on a chose in action. It was stated that a moral
duty rested on the court to withhold its aid in the present situation.
Reference was made in the dissenting opinion to cases which
have utilized the equitable formula of constructive trust to pre-
vent a murderer from acquiring property rights by the commission
of his crime. According to this theory, the legal order imposes a
trust upon the criminal who is made to hold the property for the
benefit of the person who would otherwise be entitled to it. In the
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words of Justice Cardozo, the constructive trust thus becomes the
"formula through which the conscience of equity finds expres-
sion". But the pull of common law reasoning was so strong that
the author of the dissenting opinion preferred to reach the end dic-
tated by moral doctrine, not by means of this equitable formula,
but by legal logic.
The majority opinion in the Oleff case allegedly eschewed
ethical values. Actually, the result of Analytical Jurisprudence in
England and in the United States has been the employment of the
legal order for the purpose of maintaining the values of an econo-
mic and social regime which places great emphasis on vested prop-
erty rights. For a variety of reasons, the common lawyer, gener-
ally speaking, is and has always been the protagonist of such rights.
In the early years of the common law, the social good was perhaps
best promoted by certainty and predictability in the matter of
private property, and by legal insulation against excessive feudal
burdens. But whereas these burdens grew less and less and the
social implications of property became more manifest in the light
of new applications of old ethical norms, nevertheless, property
rights remained sacred for many common lawyers, who sought to
maintain the legal status quo by adherence to the rule of stare
decisis, and the economic status quo by refusing to re-examine the
application of the moral principle originally justifying great pro-
tection of vested rights of property, so as to see if this principle
was justly operative in contemporary society.
In the English case of Everet v. Williams it appears that a bill
was filed in the equity side of the Exchequer by one highwayman
against his partner in crime for an account of the loot. The bill
was dismissed. It is patent that universally accepted moral consider-
ations prevented a judical recognition of fictitious rights claimed
by the petitioner and asserted under the guise of an equitable cause
of action.
Thus far ethical values of the law in action have been discussed
in the sphere of national or domestic society. In the seventh case,
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United StateS,7 the
rights of substance of two nations were weighed under internation-
al law. The Shoshone Indians nation claimed $15,000,000 as dam-
ages for the appropriation of about fifteen million acres of land,
held under a title said to have been recognized by the United
States in a treaty, made between the two nations in 1863. The
treaty provided for "friendly and amicable relations" between the
two nations. The content of another treaty was incorporated by
cross reference to the effect that routes of travel through the
Shoshone country should remain forever free and safe for the
7 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
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United States and its citizens. Other uses of the Shoshone country
were allowed the United States, which in turn gave a monetary
consideration. Mention was made of the geographical boundaries
of the Shoshone Country. The question was whether or not this
treaty should be interpreted as a recognition of Indian title by
implication. By a five to four decision, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the treaty in question was not such a rec-
ognition.
The majority opinion placed the burden of proof upon the
petitioners to show that the contracting parties meant to recognize
Indian title to the Shoshone Country. The treaty was strictly and
narrowly construed to mean that the contract was only an ex-
change of a promise to pay money for a promise from the Indians
to permit travel, mining, communication and transportation in the
area described by the treaty. The majority opinion was character-
ized by the traditionally analytical approach of excluding moral
values which demand resort to such environmental factors as the
respective economic and physical freedoms of the contracting par-
ties, the respective intelligence and knowledge of these parties as
to the consequences of a particular legal document, and the duty
of just-dealing when a victorious nation undertakes to delimit the
use of the vanquished nation's land by treaty. It was admitted in
the treaty that the Shoshones had "been reduced by the war to a
state of utter destitution".
It now remains for me briefly to review the materials selected
for today's symposium from the point of view of Scholastic Juris-
prudence. Significant concepts for this type of Jurisprudence in
the cases under discussion are the nature and end of man, law, so-
ciety, state, constitution, the judical and legislative processes, and
property. Scholastic philosophy postulates that man is a creature,
endowed with the distinguishing characteristics of will and reason,
with moral freedom of choice between good and evil, under a duty
to conform to the dictates of his conscience, informed by reason
and experience, perceiving to some extent an externally existent
body of ideals, embodied in a higher law.
Man, by nature and by the higher law, ordained by the first
Cause of the Universe as a measure of conduct because of the es-
sence of man, ought to form society national and international. This
society is at first under the direct discipline of the higher law, which
precedes positive law, as a means of social control, and which later
ought to receive recognition by the juridical institutions of civil
authority, adding physical sanction to an already existing ethical
coercion. Scholastic Jurisprudence does not postulate the necessity
of any specific type of juridical institution, as long as it achieves
higher law justice among men in society. It does not prescribe any
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precise form of state structure, or administration, or constitution,
or system of law for the protection of rights. In the establishment
and operation of societal organizations, it does not forbid the inter-
play of materialistic and utilitarian considerations, as long as they
remain within the inhibition of the higher or natural law, which
restrains men from evil, but otherwise encourages them to feel
free to experiment with their economic, social, political and juridical
systems.
The chief excellence of Scholastic Jurisprudence, when com-
pared with other varieties of juristic thinking, is the greater compre-
hensiveness of its approach in appraising the justice and efficiency
of a particular legal order and the decisions made by its agencies in
specific situations of fact. It does not mistake the part for the
whole. It stresses the elements of reason and experience, the trans-
cendental and the actual, the analytical and the essential, the per-
manent, idealistic and the transitory, utilitarian. Its ingredients have
been selected from universal wisdom, unlimited by historical period,
geographic location, or specific civilization, and united by the over-
all conception that man differs in kind and dignity from all the
rest of creation.
But how are these generalities related to the cases which we
are considering today? First of all, it may be noted that the judges
which decided these cases were divided as to the relative values
to be assigned to such interests as freedom of religious belief, prop-
erty, state-survival, and the acquisition of the use of land by treaty.
Each judge passed judgment on each of these interests by weighing
it in a scale of his own choice to ascertain its value, for the purpose
of deciding whether or not he could clothe the interest with a legal
right so as to be protected by the legal order. Each judge accord-
ingly used his own mechanism to measure the relative preciousness
of the interests involved, in relation to some fixed standard, whether
or not he was conscious of this fact. But in none of the cases was
there an effort to justify the standard, or the measuring device.
This means that the judical process, as it functions even in courts
of last resort, requires fixed starting points of ethical values, but is
not concerned, generally speaking, with the questions of their
source, degree of permanence, or reason for their acceptance by the
judge.
As a scholastic jurist, I favor the majority opinions in the Par-
rish and Barnette cases, and the dissenting opinions in the Shoshone
and Oleff cases. I view each factual situation as a minor premise
in a syllogism. My major premise is inductively reached by reason
and experience. Reason includes not only my own conscience, but
the objective conscience of others, competent in the rational and
social sciences. It would be a moral reason, not the reason of the
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material scientist or mathematician, since I would be dealing with
moral phenomena, ie. right and wrong human conduct. Ex-
perience would include a consideration of all relevant historical
and social data thus far available. Psychologically, I would be both
an introvert and an extrovert. My ultimate aim would be justice.
In my effort to reach it, I would not be diverted by such formal
devices or techniques, as the mechanical postulation of a presump-
tion for or against the constitutionality of the statute in question.
If the legislative process had produced a statute which conformed
in a reasonable degree with the ideals of the higher law, according
every human being certain inalienable rights, I should declare it
constitutional. But otherwise I should declare it unconstitutional,
without regard to whether it was a limitation upon property rights
or civil liberties, since all rights are human rights, even property
rights.
I believe that man is entitled in consequence of the higher law,
independent of social contracts, or states, or constitutions, or human
wills, to the use and enjoyment of property, sufficient to maintain
himself and his family in a manner reasonably appropriate to his
person and environmental needs. I would regard the social justice
of property relationships, as well as the "mine" and "thine" con-
ception as it affects individuals only.
I subject the rule of stare decisis to the test of reason, justice,
and experience. As a scholastic jurist, I would not have relied as
heavily upon legal precedent as was done in the Oleff and Adkins
cases, for this rule may be used to preserve the value of an interest,
which deserves a contemporary devaluation for the sake of justice,
i.e. the doing of right, and the avoidance of wrong. I would not
attach to a statute or a constitution supreme value, which would
be reserved for the higher law. The will of the people, as partici-
pants in the democratic process, is a proper source of law, but the
resulting imperative law obtains its ultimate vitality from the
validity of the pre-existent moral qualities which the legislator has
discovered by recourse to the objective natural law, so that in one
sense, ultimately the basis of all positive law is discovered; other-
wise there could be no inalienable rights, since these presuppose
an immutable restraint upon human will, imposed by external, uni-
versal will.
As a scholastic jurist, I approve the minority opinion in the
Shoshone case, because the majority opinion's conception of inter-
national law and the rights and duties of nations did not coincide
with the notions of the founders of the science of International Law,
such as Vitoria, a scholastic, mentioned with approval by Dr. Cohen.
Precise land boundaries were mentioned in the Shoshone Treaty.
It was obvious that the Indians were using the land in question for
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the sustenance of life. They had a moral right to the land in virtue
of the higher law. In a primitive society, morals are the sole me-
dium of social control. But international society was and remains
primitive, for fixed methods of ascertaining legal rights have not
yet been created by positive law. Hence under international law,
as understood by a scholastic jurist, the Shoshone Indians had title
to their land apart from any treaty. This title existed even though
there was no recognition of it by the United States in the Shoshone
Treaty.
I regret that time will not permit a psychoanalysis of the judges
who handed down our cases. The scholastic jurist gives adequate
attention to the factor of the mental processes of judges, and of
their emotions. Much benefit may be derived from an understand-
ing of the hidden factors of inheritance and environment, in the
judicial process. But these are subordinate in importance to the
judicial factor of the moral freedom of will of the judge in reaching
a decision, determined by the choice of ethical values and their
relation to the law in action.
